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February 2000 was a stressful month for me:  the UK 3G auction was about to begin.  For 
over two years I had been working with the UK government to design the world’s first 
auction of spectrum for “third generation” (3G) mobile-phone services. A lot was at 
stake.  If our auction worked well, it would allocate the spectrum efficiently and raise a 
lot of money, but many previous auctions had been embarrassing flops that had failed to 
generate the sums expected.  This time the politicians were hoping for billions of dollars.  
 
We had written numerous papers, developed theories, and tested prototype auction 
designs in experiments.  But would it all work on the day?  What might go wrong?  The 
bidders all had armies of consultants and lawyers.  What loopholes in the rules might they 
find to exploit?  Could they find a devious way to coordinate their bidding and so avoid 
competing against each other?  Or might our rules actually have discouraged some 
potential bidders from entering the auction at all – so destroying competition for a 
different reason?   
 
The 1990s had been littered with examples of auctions – especially of new products or 
services – that had gone disastrously wrong.  Several U.S. auctions had fallen down 
because bidders signalled to each other by including lot identification numbers and even 
phone numbers as the final digits of their bids.  The winner of a New Zealand auction had 
bid $7 million dollars, but the rules required it to pay only $5,000.  Only three bidders 
had turned up for a German auction of three blocks of spectrum, which therefore sold 
only at the tiny reserve price.  Closer to home, an auction of U.K. television broadcasting 
rights sold licences for some regions of the country at prices less than one ten-thousandth 
of others.  U.K. electricity auctions were widely criticized for yielding collusive prices.  
So would our new auction end up as just another humiliating giveaway? 
 
The tension only mounted over the seven weeks the auction ran.  The auction started 
well.  Day after day the prices climbed, but we continued to worry about what we might have missed, and what could still go wrong.  As the prices kept rising through 150 rounds 
of bidding, and records started falling, nerves gave way to astonishment.  Still, it was an 
enormous relief when the gavel finally came down on five bids totalling over 34 billion 
dollars – our auction had raised more money than any previous auction in history.  It was 
even more of a relief when the bidders all paid at the appointed time, and the sale process 
was finally over, without a hitch. 
 
In the following months, other countries held 3G auctions.  The results were very 
different.  Whereas our auction raised almost 600 dollars per head of population, most 
countries earned far less revenue, and the Swiss made only 20 dollars per head.  The key 
reason was, quite simply, how the auctions were designed: good auction design matters 
enormously.  
  
This book is in large part a story of the thinking behind the UK’s auction.  I survey the 
basic theory of how auctions work; emphasise the practical lessons that can make the 
difference between successful auctions and catastrophic ones; and discuss the one 
hundred billion dollar 3G mobile-phone auctions as a case study.  
 
 I also explore the connections with other areas of economics that originally drew me into 
studying auctions.  The increasing use of auction theory to develop insights into other 
parts of economics has been one of the most exciting parts of my professional life.  So I 
look in detail at the relationships between auctions and other economic questions. I show 
how modern auction theory can illuminate such diverse phenomena as booms and busts 
in housing markets, financial crashes and trading ‘frenzies’, political lobbying and 
negotiations, the differing costs of alternative legal systems, and the relative intensities of 
different forms of industrial competition. Thus the tools of auction theory help to explain 






This book can be used by a general reader, for a graduate course on auction theory, or – 
by picking more selectively – an advanced undergraduate or MBA course on auctions 
and auction design.   
 
None of the writing is technical, except in the Appendices.  (Indeed there are barely any 
mathematical symbols, let alone equations, outside footnotes and Appendices).  
 
Part A introduces the basic theory, and surveys the existing literature. It includes 
exercises, and technical Appendices. 
 
Part B shows that modern auction-theoretic tools and intuitions can provide extremely 
useful arguments and insights in a broad range of economic settings.  Auction theory has 
turned out to be surprisingly powerful in places that are superficially unconnected with 
auctions – many economic contexts that do not at first sight look like auctions can be 
recast to use auction-theoretic techniques.   
 
 Part C argues that important insights also flow in the other direction – from other parts of 
economics to the analysis of auctions: in particular, the key issues in practical auction 
design are not so much those that have been addressed by recent advanced auction 
theory, but rather the traditional industrial-organization issues of collusion, entry-
deterrence, etc.  I give numerous examples.  I then discuss economic policy-making more 
broadly, including the need to pay attention to political pressures and to the wider 
economic context, but illustrate these points using auction examples.   
 
Part D describes and evaluates the world-record-setting 2000-01 3G mobile-phone 
license auctions, as a case study for the earlier Parts.  I discuss the design process, as well 
as the designs and the overall successes of the different auctions. I also analyse why 
bidder strategies were a little different from those that would be suggested by the elementary theory described in Part A.  I conclude by considering the merits of running 
auctions versus the alternatives. 
 
 
Using this Book 
 
The independent general reader may read the Parts in whichever order interests him or 
her – each Part is self-sufficient and can be read in isolation, even by those without any 
previous background in auction theory.  
 
A graduate course on auctions (or a segment of a core microeconomics course) would 
dwell on Parts A and B, and cover Parts C and D more cursorily.  It should include the 
Exercises and the technical appendices to chapter 1, and could usefully be complemented 
by some additional readings from those discussed in chapter 1. (These further readings 
are reprinted in Klemperer, 2000.)   
 
Undergraduate lectures might cover the first half of Part A (and, perhaps, some of 
chapter 1’s appendices), and Parts C and D.  
 
An MBA course segment might focus on Parts C and D (except chapter 7).   
 






Most of this material was first published in 2002–2003.  The exception is chapter 1 which 
was first published in 1999; I have therefore added a short Afterword to that chapter to 
bring it up-to-date.   
 Since the papers were originally written as stand-alone contributions, there is inevitably a 
little repetition, but the overlaps should be obvious and cause the reader no problems.   
 
The papers were originally published as follows:  
 
Chapter 1 (except Afterword and Exercises).  Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature. 
Journal of Economic Surveys 1999, 13(3), 227-86.
2   
 
Chapter 2.  Why Every Economist should Learn some Auction Theory.  Advances in 
Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications (Dewatripont, Hansen and 
Turnovsky eds.) 2003, 1, 25-55




Chapter 3.  What Really Matters in Auction Design. Journal of Economic Perspectives 
2002, 16(1), 169-189 (reprinted by permission of the American Economic Association).  
 
Chapter 4.  Using and Abusing Economic Theory. Journal of the European Economic 
Association 2003, 1(2-3), 272-300 (reprinted by permission of the European Economic 
Association).
4   
 
Chapter 5.  How (Not) to Run Auctions. European Economic Review 2002, 46(4-5), 829-
845 (reprinted by permission of Elsevier).
5 
 
Chapter 6.  The Biggest Auction Ever. Economic Journal 2002, 112, C74-C96, with Ken 
Binmore (reprinted by permission of Blackwell Publishing, and the Royal Economic 
Society). 
 
Chapter 7.  Some Observations on the British 3G Telecom Auction. Ifo Studien 2002, 
48(1), 115-120, and Some Observations on the German 3G Telecom Auction. Ifo Studien 
2002, 48(1), 145-156 (reprinted by permission of the Ifo Institute).
6 
 
Chapter 8.  The Wrong Culprit for Telecom Trouble. Financial Times November 26 
2002, 21.   
 
Exercises.  Oxford University MPhil in Economics Examination.  Reprinted by 
permission of Oxford University. 
                                                 
2 Also reprinted in The Current State of Economic Science, S. Dahiya (ed.), 1999. 
3 Also Invited Lecture to Eighth World Congress of the Econometric Society 2000. 
4 Also Alfred Marshall Lecture to European Economic Association 2002, and also reprinted in  Advances in 
Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, S. Hurn (ed.), forthcoming.    
5 Also reprinted in Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunications, G. Illing (ed.), MIT Press, 
forthcoming.   
6 Both papers also reprinted in Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunications, G. Illing (ed.), 
MIT Press, forthcoming.     
 
Collecting these papers together in a volume was inspired by the invitation to give the 
inaugural series of the Toulouse Lectures which were based on them. I am most grateful 
to Jacques Cremer, Jean-Jacques  Laffont, and Jean Tirole for the invitation and for their 
hospitality during my visit, and to Richard Baggaley of the Princeton University Press for 
his smooth running of the whole publication process.  
 
I could not have written any of these papers without the benefit of the enormous amount I 
have learnt from my friends and colleagues.  Many of these are thanked in the 
acknowledgements to the individual chapters, but Jeremy Bulow and Marco Pagnozzi 
deserve special thanks.  
 
Finally, I was the principal auction theorist advising the UK Government on the design of 
its "3G" mobile-phone auction,
7  I am a Member of the UK Competition Commission, 
and  I have advised several other Government agencies in the UK, US, and EU, but the 
views expressed in this book are mine alone.  Furthermore, although some observers 
thought some of the behavior described below warranted regulatory investigation, I do 
not intend to suggest that any of it violates any applicable rules or laws. 
 
 
                                                 
7 Ken Binmore led the team and supervised experiments testing the proposed designs.   




Auction theory is one of economics’ success stories. It is of both practical and theoretical 
importance: practical importance, because many of the world’s most important markets 
are auction markets, and good auction theory has made the difference between successful 
auctions and disastrous ones; theoretical importance, because lessons from auction theory 
have led to important insights elsewhere in economics. 
 
Auctions are not a new idea: the Babylonians auctioned wives, the ancient Greeks 
auctioned mine concessions and, in addition to their notorious slave auctions, the Romans 
auctioned everything from war booty to debtors’ property.  In the modern world, auctions 
are used to conduct a huge volume of economic transactions. Governments use them to 
sell treasury bills, foreign exchange, mineral rights including oil fields, and other assets 
such as firms to be privatized. Government contracts are typically awarded by 
procurement auctions, which are also often used by firms subcontracting work or buying 
services and raw materials.  In these cases, of course, the auctioneer is seeking a low 
price rather than a high price.  Houses, cars, agricultural produce and livestock, art and 
antiques are commonly sold by auction.  Other economic transactions, for example 
takeover battles, are auctions by another name. 
 
The range of items sold by auction has been greatly increased by e-commerce, and in the 
last decade or so there has also been an explosion of interest in using auctions to set up 
new markets, for example, for energy, transport, and emissions permits.  Although many 
of these markets do not look like auctions to the layperson, they are best understood 
through auction theory.  (For example, electricity markets are best described and 
analyzed as auctions of infinitely-divisible quantities of identical goods.)  The auctions of 
mobile phone licenses across the world are only the most famous of the new auction 
markets.   
Not only are auctions an increasingly important part of the way the economy allocates 
resources, but also economists have increasingly realised the wider importance of auction 
theory: it has been the basis of much fundamental theoretical work not directly related to 
auctions. Many economic contexts that do not at first sight look like auctions can be 
recast to use auction-theoretic techniques, and a good understanding of auction theory is 
valuable in developing intuitions and insights that can inform the analysis of many 
mainstream economic questions. 
 
This book considers the theory of auctions, practical auction design including case 
studies, and the application of auction theory to other areas of economics.   
 
 
A.  Auction theory  
 
Two basic designs of auction are most commonly used: the ascending auction, in which 
the price is raised successively until only one bidder remains and that bidder wins the 
object at the final price she bid; and the first-price sealed-bid auction, in which each 
bidder independently submits a single bid without seeing others’ bids, the object is sold 
to the bidder who makes the highest bid, and the winner pays the amount she offered.  
 
The key result in auction theory is the remarkable Revenue Equivalence Theorem which, 
subject to some reasonable-sounding conditions, tells us that the seller can expect equal 
profits on average from all the standard (and many non-standard) types of auctions,  and 
that buyers are also indifferent among them all. William Vickrey’s Nobel Prize was in 
large part awarded for his (1961, 1962) papers which developed some special cases of the 
theorem, and Riley and Samuelson (1981) and Myerson (1981) offer more general 
treatments.   
 
Much of auction theory can be understood in terms of this theorem, and how its results 
are affected by relaxing its assumptions of a fixed number of “symmetric”, risk-neutral bidders, who each want a single unit, have independent information, and bid 
independently.  Myerson’s (1981) paper shows how to derive optimal auctions (that is, 
auctions that maximize the seller's expected revenue) when the assumption of symmetry 
fails.  Maskin and Riley (1984) consider the case of risk-averse bidders, in which case the 
first-price sealed-bid auction is the most profitable of the standard auctions.  Milgrom and 
Weber (1982) analyzed auctions when the assumption of independent information is 
replaced by one of “affiliated” information, and showed that the most profitable standard 
auction is then the ascending auction.  (Roughly, bidders’ information is affiliated if 
when one bidder has more optimistic information about the value of the prize, it is more 
likely that other bidders’ information will also be optimistic.)  Models of auctions in 
which bidders bid for multiple units lead to less clear conclusions.  For practical auction 
design, however, it is probably most important to remove the assumptions that the 
number of bidders is unaffected by the auction design, and that the bidders necessarily 
bid independently of each other; sealed-bid designs frequently (but not always) both 
attract a larger number of serious bidders and are better at discouraging collusion than are 
ascending designs (Klemperer 1998, 2002). 
 
Part A covers all these issues and a range of other topics including double-auctions, 
royalties, incentive contracts, budget constraints, externalities between bidders, and the 
winner’s curse.  Appendices contain technical details, some simple worked examples, 




B.  Applications to other areas of economics 
 
There are close connections between auction theory and other areas of economics.  
 
By carefully analyzing very simple trading models, auction theory is developing the 
fundamental building-blocks for our understanding of more complex environments.  It 
has been important in developing our understanding of other methods of price formation, including posted prices and negotiations in which both the buyer and seller are actively 
involved in determining the price.   
 
There are especially close connections between the theories of auctions and perfect 
competition. Wilson (1977), Milgrom (1979), and others have developed conditions 
under which the sale price of an object whose value is actually the same to all bidders 
converges to this value as the number of bidders  increases, even though each individual 
bidder has only partial information about this value.  The fact that an auction can thus 
fully aggregate all of the economy’s information helps to support some of our ideas about 
perfect competition and rational expectations equilibrium. 
 
There is also a close analogy between the theory of optimal auctions and that of 
monopoly pricing; the analysis of optimal auctions is “essentially equivalent to the 
analysis of standard monopoly third-degree price discrimination” (Bulow and Roberts, 
1989).  Thus insights can be translated from monopoly theory to auction theory and vice-
versa. 
 
Because auctions are such simple and well-defined economic institutions, they have 
become an important testing ground for economic theory, and especially game theory.  
So auctions are also the basis of flourishing new empirical and experimental literatures. 
 
More recently, auction-theoretic tools have been used to provide useful arguments in a 
broader range of contexts – including many that do not, at first sight, look like auctions – 
starting with models of oligopolistic pricing, running through non-price means of 
allocation such as queues, wars of attrition, lobbying contests, other kinds of 
tournaments, and rationing, and extending to models in finance, law and economics, labor 
economics, political economy, etc. 
 
Part B discusses the connections between auctions and other areas of economics, 
emphasizing these broader uses of auction theory.  It aims to demonstrate that auction 
theory should be a part of every economist’s armory.  
C.  Practical auction design 
 
Although there are now many extremely successful auction markets – and economists 
have much to be proud of in their role in developing them – there have also been some 
notable fiascos. Certain auctions of TV franchises, companies, electricity, mobile-phone 
licenses, etc., have failed badly – even comically – providing useful illustrations of what 
really matters in practical auction design. 
 
The most important point is that everything depends on the context.  Auction design is 
not “one size fits all”.  A good auction needs to be tailored to the specific details of the 
situation, and must also reflect the wider economic circumstances.  
 
Second, as stressed above, the critical issues are usually the bread-and-butter industrial-
organization problems of encouraging entry and discouraging collusion.  The more subtle 
points addressed by recent advanced auction theory are, more often than not, of lesser 
importance.  So, for example, the Anglo-Dutch auction – a hybrid of the sealed-bid and 
ascending auctions – may often perform better than standard ascending auctions which 
are particularly vulnerable to collusive, predatory, and entry-deterring behaviour. 
 
Finally, when advising governments, auction designers (and economic policy-makers 
more generally) need to be sensitive to the dangers posed by political and administrative 
pressures, and make their proposals robust to changes that are likely to be imposed. 
Part C discusses all these issues, using numerous examples.  Chapter 3 focuses on 
practical auction design, while chapter 4 takes a broader perspective on the policy-
making process, but illustrates its points using examples of auctions. 
  
D.  Case study 
 
The 2000-01 ‘3G’ mobile-phone license auctions not only raised one hundred billion 
dollars and attracted intense media scrutiny; they also provide an excellent illustration of 
our points about practical design.  Even though the licences sold were very similar in 
each of the nine west European auctions, the different auction designs resulted in 
revenues that varied from less than 20 Euros per capita in Switzerland to over 650 Euros 
per capita in the UK.   
 
Part D describes and evaluates the 3G auctions as a case study for the earlier Parts.  I 
describe the design, and overall success, of each of the auctions (chapter 5); discuss the 
design process, and give fuller details of the successful UK auction which I helped design 
(chapter 6); and analyze why bidder strategies were a little different from those suggested 
by elementary theory (chapter 7).  Finally, I discuss the merits of running auctions versus 
the alternatives (chapter 8): although it is now fashionable to blame the 3G auctions for 
all the telecommunication industry’s problems, there is absolutely no foundation for this. 
In spite of the design errors that were made, allocating the 3G licences by auctions was 
clearly the correct policy. 
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